Inter-American System by Martin, Claudia
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, Courts Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, 





During the period covered by this report, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights
(hereinafter the'Court') issued several decisions on merits, including: Tristan Donoso
vs Panama; Rios et al. vs Venezuela; Perozo et al. vs Venezuela; Kawas Fernandez vs
Honduras; Reveron Trujillo vs Venezuela; Acevedo Buendia et al. ('Discharged and
Retired Employees of the Office of the Comptroller') vs Peru; Escher et al. vs Brazil;
Anzualdo Castro vs Peru; and Dacosta Cadogan vs Barbados. Also, the Court adopted
interpretation judgements clarifying aspects of previous decisions on the merits in
Ticona Estrada et al. vs Bolivia and Valle Jaramillo et al. vs Colombia.
The present report will analyse the Court's decisions in Tristan Donoso vs Panama
and Escher et al. vs Brazil, regarding the protection of the right to privacy, honour and
reputation. Also, the report will cover the Court's judgements in Reveron Trujillo vs
Venezuela and Perozo et al. vs Venezuela, concerning the destitution of judges and
the right to freedom of expression in the context of a polarised political situation in
Venezuela.
The full text of the decisions mentioned in this report can be found in English on
the website of the Court at: www.corteidh.or.cr.
Claudia Martin is Co-Director of the Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and
Professorial Lecturer in Residence, American University, Washington College of Law (WCL). She
would like to thank the research and editing support of Veronica Garcia Ulloa, research assistant at
the Academy and American University WCL.
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2. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, HONOUR AND REPUTATION:
WIRETAPPING AND DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE
CONVERSATIONS
In two recent decisions in the cases Escher et al. vs Brazil' and Tristan Donoso vs
Panama,2 the Court for the first time defined the scope of the right to privacy,
honour and reputation protected under Article 11 of the American Convention on
Human Rights ('American Convention' or 'Convention') in regard to wiretapping and
disclosure of private conversations.
In Escher, the alleged victims were members of the social organisations ADECON
and COANA, which had a de facto relationship with the landless rural workers
movement MST (Movimento dos Trabhaladores Rurais Sem Terra) and shared
a common goal of advancing agrarian reform. The facts of this case occurred in a
context of social conflict related to the agrarian reform in several Brazilian states,
including the state of Parana where the organisations were based.
On 28 April 1999, the Chief of Staff of the Military Police, Colonel Kretschmer
asked the Secretary of Public Security of the state of Parana, Candido Martins, to get
authorisation from the District Court of Loanda ('Loanda Court') for the interception
and monitoring of communications of the telephone lines of COANA. On 5 May
1999, Major Neves, head of the Aguila Group of Military Police in Parana, filed
before the Loanda Court, a special request to intercept and monitor the telephone
line of COANA. The request was based on the alleged existence of evidence linking
members of the organisation to illegal activities, including the diversion of funds and
the murder of the brother of a MST leader. On that same day, Judge Khater, of Loanda
Court, authorised the request without stating the grounds and without notifying her
decision to the Prosecutor General's Office.
On 12 May 1999, a second request for telephone interception was requested by
the Military Police Sergeant Silva. This time the request also included the telephone
line installed in the offices of ADECON. The reason for the request was not given,
but Judge Khater authorised the request without stating the grounds and without
notifying her decision to the Prosecutor General's Office. On 25 May 1999, Major
Neves, requested the interception and monitoring to cease because the desired
effect had already been produced. Judge Khater responded on the same day and sent
an official communication to the director of the telephone company to cancel the
interception of COANA and ADECON lines.
On 7 June 1999, extracts of the recorded conversations appeared in a national
television news programme that had one of the largest audiences in the country.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Escher et al. vs Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, judgement of 6 July 2009, Series C, No. 200.
2 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Tristan Donoso vs Panama, Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, judgement of 27 January 2009, Series C, No. 193.
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The following day, the Secretary of Security held a press conference where he gave
explanations about the telephone interceptions, his opinion on the conversations
disseminated and the measures that the Secretariat of Public Security would adopt. At
this press conference, some recordings were played of the intercepted conversations
and the journalists present received materials with extracts transcribed from the
intercepted discussions of members from COANA and ADECON. Afterwards,
fragments of the recordings were disseminated again by the television and written
media. Some articles claimed that the landless workers were planning specific crimes
and that the Secretary of Security had published new extracts from the tapes during
the press conference.
On 1 July 1999, Major Neves filed an official communication with Judge Khater,
making certain charges against the MST and gave the judge 123 tapes of the telephone
conversations recorded during the interception of the two telephone lines. The first
stage of the recordings took place from 14-26 May 1999, and the second stage occurred
from 9-23 June 1999. Transcripts of the telephone interceptions were not submitted.
Only summaries of the extracts the police considered relevant were submitted. In
Major Neves' report he mentioned that a Military Police officer unlawfully gave
the press and other individuals probative material because this officer was an agent
clandestinely in the police force receiving favours and/or money to provide MST
important information on police preparations and actions. The report mentioned that
the Military Police were taking measures to investigate and punish this officer for
disseminating the recorded material.
On 2 July 1999, the telephone company deactivated the technical equipment
for monitoring the COANA and ADECON telephone lines. Almost a year later, on
30 May 2000, Judge Khater, sent the file of the monitoring petition to the Prosecutor
General's Office for a first time analysis. On 8 September 2000, the Prosecutor General's
Office requested the Loanda Court to declare that the interceptions were invalid, and
that the recorded tapes should not be used. On 18 April 2002, Judge Khater rejected
the opinion of the Prosecutor General's Office because it had not been proved that the
interceptions were illegal, but ordered the tapes be incinerated, which was done on
23 April 2002.
MST and the CPT (Commissio Pastoral da Terra (Rural Land Commission))
filed a criminal complaint against: the Secretary of Security, Judge Khater, Colonel
Kretschmer, Major Neves, and Sergeant Silva for the illegal interception ofthe telephone
lines and other crimes, which eventually did not succeed. COANA, ADECON, and
the victims - Arlei Escher, Celso Aghinoni and Avanilson Aratijo - filed a mandado
de seguranga (constitutional remedy) against Judge Khater, requesting the suspension
of the telephone wiretapping and the destruction of the recorded tapes, which did not
succeed. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Khater but it was also
rejected. Arlei Escher and Luciano de Vargas, filed civil actions against the state of
Parana for reparation of non-pecuniary damage. The final judgement had not been
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handed down in these proceedings at the time the Court issued the decision under
analysis.
The Court first asserted that telephone conversations fell within the sphere of
protection of the right to privacy and were protected under Article 11 of the American
Convention. Conversations held through a private telephone line or a business line, as
well as those related to private or business matters were protected by that provision.
Article 11, also protected the right to honour and reputation. The right to honour
related to self-esteem and self-worth, while reputation referred to the opinion that
other individuals had on the affected person.
Next, the Court concluded that the telephone conversations of the alleged victims
were private and that they had not authorised their conversations to be disseminated;
thus, the interception of the conversations by State agents constituted interference in
their private life. To determine whether this interference was arbitrary or abusive or
whether it conformed with the American Convention, the reason for the interference
had to be: established by law, have a legitimate purpose, and be appropriate, necessary,
and proportionate. The Court noted that there was an established Law No. 9,296/96,
dealing with telephone interceptions requested by the police authority in a criminal
investigation. Nonetheless, the Court determined that this law was not followed
because: i) both requests for the telephone interceptions failed to establish that the
interception was for the purpose of a criminal investigation or for the preliminary
investigation in a criminal action; ii) none of the interception requests or decisions
granting them gave reasonable indications of the participation of members of
COANA and ADECON, on the criminal offense or the means to implement the
requested interceptions, and they failed to prove that the mean used was the only one
possible way to obtain the evidence; iii) the civil police was exclusively responsible
for investigating the criminal acts not the Military Police as was the case here; iv)
Judge Khater failed to give the grounds to justify the telephone interception order and
maximum duration of the procedure; and v) the Prosecutor's Office was not advised
of the interception until more that a year after the interception orders were issued. The
transcripts of the recorded material were not provided to the case of the monitoring
petition. Therefore, the Court concluded that Law No. 9,296/96 was violated and the
requirement of legality was not established. In sum, the State violated the right to
privacy established in Article 11, with the telephone interceptions and recordings.
Also, the dissemination of the telephone conversations affected the honour and
reputation of the alleged victims under Article 11 of the Convention. The Court
concluded that in the first dissemination the State did not provide a satisfactory
explanation to how the recordings ended up in the media where it should have been
available to only a limited number of police and judicial authorities; therefore, the State
failed to comply with its obligation to protect the recordings adequately. Regarding
the dissemination by the Secretary of Security, in allowing other persons to hear the
recordings and by distributing printed portions of the conversations without legal
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authorisation or a court order as required by Law No. 9,296/96, it too was unlawful.
Therefore, by disseminating private conversations that were protected by judicial
confidentiality, without obtaining the legal requirements, Brazil violated the victims'
right to protection of their honour, and reputation under Article 11 of the American
Convention.
In addition, the Court concluded that interception, monitoring, recording and
dissemination of the victims' telephone communications violated their right to
association under Article 16 of the Convention. Under this provision, individuals
have the right to associate freely with others, without State interference. Also, Article
16 imposes upon States positive obligations to prevent attacks against associations,
to protect those who participate in associations and to investigate any violations
perpetrated against those individuals who exercise this right. In the case of human
rights defenders, States have obligations to facilitate their mission, to protect them
when they are threatened and to investigate any violations of rights perpetrated
against them in their course of work.
The Court concluded that the telephone interceptions and recordings were more
about investigating MST activities than the stated objectives, which were the alleged
diversion of public funds and the death of the brother of a local activist. Therefore, the
Court held that the monitoring of the telephone communications of the association,
without respecting the legal requirements, with stated objectives that were not
supported by the acts and the conduct of the police and judicial authorities, and then
their dissemination caused fear and tensions and affected the image and credibility
of the associations. Therefore, Brazil violated the right to freedom of association
established in Article 16 of the Convention.
Finally, the Court concluded that some of the domestic remedies to which the
victims resorted in the domestic jurisdiction for protection of their fundamental
rights were not effective to ensure their rights to a remedy and to a fair trial protected
under Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention. In particular, the Court
found that the lack of due diligence on the part of the State to conduct an adequate
investigation on the recordings and dissemination of the conversations violated the
victims' right to an effective remedy. Moreover, the State violated Articles 8 and 25, in
the administrative proceedings against Judge Khater because the administrative body
examining the petition failed to state the reason for finding no responsibility on the
part of the judge.
In Tristan Donoso vs Panama, the victim's right to privacy was also affected as a
result of a telephone interception and the subsequent dissemination of the contents
of that conversation. Bishop Ariz requested Tristan Donoso, counsel for the Catholic
Church, to render professional services to Walid Fayed and his family. Walid was in
custody in the course of criminal proceedings for a money laundering offense. During
custody, Walid was offered his liberty for money. Walid agreed to cooperate in the
investigation against the extorters by recording the conversation he had with them.
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 27/4 (2009) 607
Human Rights News
On 7 July 1996, a newspaper article alleged that two companies that donated a
check for the 1994 reelection campaign of the then Attorney General, were supposedly
used by criminal organisations to launder money from narcotics trafficking. The
following day, Donoso and Walid's father had a telephone conversation on the possible
publication of a press report stating that, unlike Walid's company, the two companies
that allegedly financed the Attorney General's reelection with drug trafficking money
were not being investigated for money laundering. On 9 July 1996, the newspaper
published that the check drawn to finance the reelection campaign was false.
As part of the extortion investigation started in connection to Walid, Prosecutor
Prado, requested from the Attorney General to have the telephones at the Zayed family's
residence recorded, and to authorise the police to record and film the conversations
and meetings that Walid might have with his extorters, exempting his family and
defense counsel. On 10 July 1996, Prado gave the Attorney General a cassette and
videocassette that contained the conversations with the extorters, and one cassette
with the telephone calls made from the Zayed family's residence. The cassettes were
done without authorisation from the Office of the Public Attorneys.
On 12 July 1996, the Attorney General issued two orders to give Prado a permit
to proceed as requested and another to the National Telecommunications Institute
to tap the telephone at the Zayed family residence for a 15 day period. On 16 July
1996, the Archbishop of Panama received the cassette with the recorded conversation
between Donoso and Walid's father. The Archbishop transmitted the cassette to
Bishop Ariz, who in turn informed Donoso about the existence of the telephone
recording. Bishop Ariz and Donoso went to request an explanation from the Attorney
General, who only received Bishop Ariz. The Attorney General told Bishop Ariz that
the cassette highlighted the scheme that Donoso was making against the Office of
the Public Attorney. During a meeting with the Governing Board of the National Bar
Association, the Attorney General disclosed Donoso's conversation and said it was a
conspiracy by Donoso against him and the Office of the Public Attorney.
On 25 March 1999, Donoso held a press conference where he stated that the
former Attorney General had recorded and disclosed his private conversation.
During the time of this press conference, there was debate in Panama over the power
of the Attorney General to wiretap telephone conversations. The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and a civil judge participated in this debate and questioned the power
of the Attorney General. Also, Donoso filed a criminal complaint against the former
Attorney General for the recording and disclosure of his conversation. The complaint
was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court of Panama.
On 26 March 1999, the Attorney General filed a criminal complaint against
Donoso for defamation. The Panama Superior Court of Justice convicted Donoso for
defamation and sentenced him to imprisonment for 18 months and disqualified him
to hold public office for an equal term. The imprisonment was substituted by a fine.
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In relation to the right to privacy under Article 11, the Court stated that the
right to privacy is not an absolute one, so it may be restricted by the States provided
that the interference is not abusive or arbitrary. The Court found that there was not
sufficient evidence to prove before the Court, the State's responsibility for recording
the telephone conversation. Therefore, the State did not violate Article 11, in relation
to the recording of the conversation.
Regarding the telephone conversation disclosure, the Court stated that in order
to be in line with the American Convention, the ground for the disclosure had to be
contemplated in legislation, serve a legitimate purpose, and be suitable, necessary,
and proportionate. Panama argued that the disclosure of the conversation was lawful
and served two purposes: one was to prevent a criminal conspiracy to defame the
then Attorney General, the other was to inform the authorities of the National Bar
Association on the breach of the professional ethics code. The Court found that the
State's laws would have allowed the telephone conversation to be disclosed onlyto certain
persons, who in this case would had been a judge having competent jurisdiction and
the Ethical Review Board of the National Bar Association. Since the Attorney General,
disclosed it to certain members of the Board of the National Bar Association and to
Catholic priests, the disclosure lacked statutory grounds. Moreover, the comments
uttered by the Attorney General, during the disclosure to the members of the National
Bar Association, indicating that it was a 'defamation plan' or a 'conspiracy' may be
deemed to have affected the honour and reputation of Donoso. Therefore, the Court
held that the disclosure of the recording along with the Attorney General's comments
violated the rights to a private life and to the honour and reputation of Donoso under
Article 11 of the Convention. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the argument that the
State failed to guarantee private life through the criminal proceedings because there
were no evidentiary items on the record that showed that the investigation carried out
against the then Attorney General was hierarchically subordinated to his office.
Additionally, the Court found that the criminal conviction for the charge of
defamation violated Article 13 of the Convention. The Court asserted that freedom of
expression is not an absolute right, but that Article 13, gives States the power to restrict
the exercise of this right by imposing subsequent liability in the event of abuse. For
the restriction to be permissible it must be enacted by law, serve a legitimate purpose,
and be adequate, necessary and commensurate. The Court found that the first two
grounds were met because defamation was considered a crime in domestic legislation
and because its aim was to safeguard the reputation of others, a right that public
officials also enjoy. As to the necessity for the measure, the Court stated that State
punitive power should be exercised only to the extent strictly necessary by analysing:
the seriousness of the conduct of the individual who expressed the opinion, his
actual malice, the unfair damaged caused, and other information that shows absolute
necessity to resort to criminal proceedings. The Court found that the criminal
sanction was not necessary because there were facts that led Donoso to believe that
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his accusations against the then Attorney General were not groundless. At the time of
the press conference, the following facts supported that belief: the Attorney General
was the only one able to authorise wiretappings; the former Attorney General was
in possession of the tape containing the private conversation; the former Attorney
General delivered the tape and a transcript of its contents to the Catholic Church; and
the Attorney General played the tape to the authorities of the National Bar Association
during a meeting in his office. Moreover, the criminal complaint filed against the then
Attorney General was another element to consider, since it shows that Donoso was
under the impression that there were sufficient grounds for his statements. Therefore,
the Court held that the State's criminal punishment on Donoso violated his right to
freedom of expression.
The Court dismissed the alleged violations to Articles 8 and 25, in relation to the
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Donoso against the Attorney General.
Furthermore, the Court held that the State did not violate the right of due process
of law in Article 8, in the investigation carried out against Donoso for the crime of
defamation. The Court, however, found that Panama violated the right to a fair trial
under Article 8 of the Convention for the lack of sufficient grounds in the Supreme
Court's decision on the disclosure of the telephone conversation. The Court held that
the Supreme Court should have provided the grounds for its decisions regarding the
disclosure of the telephone conversation and if found that disclosure existed, should
have given the reasons why the act was described or not in a criminal statute, possibly
with the pertinent responsibilities.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS IN VENEZUELA: DESTITUTION OF
JUDGES AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The Reveron Trujillo Case3 reflects the ongoing debate on the situation of provisional
judges in Venezuela. Provisional judges have been appointed since the Constituent
Assembly declared the reorganisation of the Judicial Branch and created a Judicial
Emergency Commission in 1999. Depending on the years, the provisional judges have
been appointed by different organs, including the Judicial Emergency Commission,
the Judicial Commission of the Supreme Justice Tribunal or the full Supreme Justice
Tribunal. According to Venezuelan officials and consolidated domestic case-law
'provisional judges are of free appointment and removal'.4 At the time the facts of
this case transpired, the percentage of provisional judges reached about 80 percent;
3 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Reveron Trujillo vs Venezuela, Preliminary Objection,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, judgement of 30 June 2009, Series C, No. 197.
Ibidem, at para. 101.
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by the end of 2008 it had decreased considerably, but still remained at approximately
44 percent.5
The issue of provisional judges in Venezuela was first addressed by the Court in
Aptiz Barbera et al. vs Venezuela.6 The Court concluded that provisional judges should
be ensured conditions to exercise their role independently; therefore, rules applicable
to permanent tenured judges on promotion, transfer and distribution of cases, as
well as suspension and/or removal from office should be equally applied to those
provisionally appointed. The Court followed a similar approach in Reveron Trujillo.
Mrs Reveron Trujillo was appointed on 16 July 1999, a First Instance Criminal
Judge under a provisional nature until 'the holding of the corresponding tenders'. In
2002, Mrs Reveron Trujillo, acted specifically as the Fourteenth First Instance Trial
Judge of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Judicial District of the Metropolitan
Area of Caracas. On 6 February 2002, Reveron Trujillo was dismissed from her
position by the Commission for the Operation and Restructuring of the Judicial
System (hereinafter CFRSJ), claiming that she had incurred in disciplinary offenses,
according to the Organic Law of the Judiciary Council and the Law on the Judicial
Career, including 'abuse or excessive use of authority' and the failure to comply with
her obligation to 'exercise due attention and diligence' in the processing of a case. Mrs
Reveron Trujillo filed an administrative appeal for reconsideration before the CFRSJ,
which eventually declared the appeal inadmissible. On 19 March 2002, Mrs Reveron
Trujillo filed an appeal for annulment before the Political-Administrative Chamber of
the Supreme Court of Justice (hereinafter SPA), requesting a precautionary suspension
of the effects of the appealed act. The SPA dismissed the demand of suspension of the
effects of the act, but concluded that the CFRSJ decision to dismiss was unlawful.
The SPA did not order the payment of salaries or reinstatement because there was a
judicial restructuring process where all judicial positions where submitted to public
competitive tenders. However, the SPA did order that all mentions of the punishment
be deleted off Mrs Reveron Trujillo's file.
The Court first looked to whether reinstatement to the position was an effective
remedy after the arbitrary dismissal of the judge. The Court highlighted the importance
ofjudicial independence, which included an adequate appointment process, the tenure
in the position, and the guarantee against external pressures. The Court determined
that reinstatement is needed for a remedy that declares the nullity of an unlawful
dismissal of a judge. Then the Court looked to see if the reasons indicated by the
SPA, which were the judicial restructuring process and the provisional nature of the
position of the judge, were adequate restrictions to the reinstatement and payment
of salaries. The Court concluded that the transition regimen and the provisional
position were not acceptable reasons for lacking reinstatement. The Court stated that
s Ibidem, at paras 103-106.
6 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Apitz Barbera vs Venezuela, Preliminary Objection,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, judgement of 5 August 2008, Series C, No. 182.
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a necessary corollary of the guarantee of tenure in the position of provisional judges,
like that of titular judges, is the reinstatement to their position, and reimbursement
of their salaries, when it has been proven, as in the present case, that the dismissal
was arbitrary. Therefore, the State violated Article 25 of the American Convention,
since the remedy to which Mrs Reveron Trujillo had access to did not offer adequate
reparations, and because there was no justified reason for denying reinstatement and
payment of salaries.
Also, the Court considered the alleged violation to the right to have access to public
service in general conditions of equality under Article 23(1)(c) of the Convention. The
Court asserted that this right protects the access to a direct form of participation
in the design, implementation, development, and execution of the State's political
guidelines through public service. Therefore, it is necessary that the State generate
optimal conditions and mechanisms in order for those political rights to be exercised
effectively, respecting the principle of equality and non-discrimination. Given that the
SPA, would have likely reinstated a titular judge, whereas not a provisional judge, the
Court decided that the difference in treatment between judges does not respond to a
reasonable criterion pursuant to the Convention. Therefore, the State violated Article
23, because Mrs Reveron Trujillo suffered an arbitrary, unequal treatment regarding
the right to remain, under equal conditions, in the exercise of public service.
In Perozo et al. vs Venezuela7 and Rios et al. vs Venezuela,8 the Court addressed
the issue of whether a situation of repeated attacks and harassment against media
representatives carried out by private actors, in a context of political polarisation
resulting from statements given by the highest-rank public officers of the State,
against journalists and media outlets, violated the rights to freedom of expression and
personal integrity under Articles 13 and 5 of the American Convention. Given space
considerations, this report will only cover the facts and issues addressed in Perozo et
al. vs Venezuela.
At the time of the facts in Perozo, Venezuela was in a period of political and
institutional conflict, which resulted in extreme polarisation of society. On 2 April
2002, the Workers' Confederation of Venezuela and Fedecamaras (Federal Chamber
of Commerce and Production) went on strike. On 11 April 2002, an opposition march
took place, demanding the resignation of Venezuela's President. This situation led to
violence, an attack on the constitutional government through a coup d'itat, and the
subsequent restoration of the constitutional order. This setting caused ongoing attacks
and threats against reporters, cameramen, photographers and other workers of mass
media, especially to individuals related to the media outlet Globovision, whom were
the victims in the present case. Venezuela alleged Globovision had a 'programme'
7 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Perozo et al. vs Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, judgement of 29 January 2009, Series C, No. 195.
8 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Rios et al. vs Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, judgement of 28 January 2009, Series C, No. 194.
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against the government, which promoted instability in society. The victims alleged
that after high-rank public officials made statements about Globovision's'programme',
members of Globovision were subject to an ongoing and escalating campaign of
harassment and aggression, which prevented them from performing their jobs. The
victims also claimed damage to Globovision's property. The victims alleged that some
aggressors were members of'Bolivarian Circles', a group in support of the government.
The particular incident of each victim was described, along with claims that the State
failed to protect the victims and undertake a serious and effective investigation of
these incidents to identify and punish those responsible.
The Court concluded, that it was not proven from the statements of the public
officials that they authorised, incited, directed or ordered violent attacks against
the victims, and highlighted that unidentified individuals, not State agents directly
violated human treatment of the victims. Nonetheless, the Court pointed out that the
statements made by the highest-ranking authorities of the Venezuelan State placed
those who worked for Globovision in a position of greater vulnerability, and created
or contributed to an increase of hostility by some sectors of the population, against
those who worked in that particular media outlet. That situation constituted the State's
failure on its duty to prevent that the exercise of the victims' right to seek, receive and
impart information be affected, as a result of the harassment and attacks perpetrated
by private actors, while the victims performed their jobs. Furthermore, the Court
held that there was enough evidence to conclude that the State violated its obligation
to guarantee the right to mental and moral integrity of some of the victims in view of
the impairments in their personal and professional lives.
With regard to the investigation of the criminal activities, the Court took into
consideration the delay by the victims in reporting the attacks, but held that the
State could not justify its total inactivity to conduct an investigation based on the
fact that they were not brought to the attention of the competent authority, by means
of the procedure established by the domestic legislation. The Court also held that
only 19 of the 48 facts reported were investigated, and in those 19, no responsible
person had been identified; therefore, in those cases the investigations were not an
effective means to insure the right to humane treatment and the right to seek, receive
and impart information of the alleged victims. The attacks or the risk situations for
personal integrity of the victims, in the contexts of the statements given by high-
ranking public officials, and the failure of State authorities to comply with the duty
of due diligence in the investigations, constituted a failure of the State's obligation to
prevent and investigate the facts. Therefore, the State violated its duty to freely seek,
receive and impart information and the right to humane treatment of Articles 13 and
5 of the American Convention.
In the end, the Court attributed international responsibility to Venezuela for the
actions carried out by private individuals under the assumption that the State was
aware of the existence of a risk, the creation of which it apparently contributed to
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through the statements of high-ranking officials, and failed to act with due diligence
to prevent the impediment of Globovision's workers' right to freedom of expression
and personal integrity.
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